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Abstract—The popularity of social networking sites has led to
the creation of massive online databases containing (potentially
sensitive) personal information, portions of which are often
publicly accessible. Although most popular social networking sites
allow users to customize the degree to which their information
is publicly exposed, the disclosure of even a small, seemingly
innocuous set of proﬁle attributes may be sufﬁcient to infer
a surprisingly revealing set of attribute-value pairings. This
paper analyzes the predictive accuracy of existing and ensemble
inference algorithms to infer hidden attributes using publicly
exposed attribute-values. For our tested population, we ﬁnd that
(i) certain attributes are more accurately predicted than others,
(ii) each tested inference algorithm is well-suited for inferring a
particular subset of attributes, and (iii) these subsets of inferable
attributes often have little overlap. Taken collectively, our results
indicate that the amount of information one can extract from a
given user’s public proﬁle is often greater than the sum of the
attributes that the user has chosen to publish.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networking sites provide a convenient and
user-friendly method of sharing user-generated content. To
participate in these online networks, a user creates a proﬁle
that may contain potentially sensitive information (e.g., status
as a job seeker, relationship status, sexual orientation, etc.).
Fortunately, most popular social networking sites also provide
access controls over online proﬁles—for example, permitting
users to reveal certain attribute-values only to authorized peers.
However, many users are not aware that their private data
can potentially be revealed by straightforward analysis. In this
paper, we study the unintended leakage of potentially sensitive
information through users’ publicly accessible online proﬁles.
Speciﬁcally, we investigate the degree to which publicly avail-
able site-level data can be leveraged to determine undisclosed
attributes of users. Our goal is to understand which attributes
are most easily inferable (high leakage risk) and most useful
for inferring hidden attributes (high inference potential).
Given the sometimes sensitive nature of information posted
on social networking sites, a growing body of research attempts
to understand and mitigate the risks associated with disclosing
potentially sensitive information (cf. [5, 6, 13, 16, 19, 20]).
Inferring attribute-values of individual proﬁles [4, 5, 14, 17,
19, 21] and reidentiﬁcation studies [5, 6, 13, 16, 19, 20] are
also growing areas of research.
Similar to some of these works, this paper demonstrates
that despite existing privacy mechanisms, potentially sensitive
information about a targeted user can be determined using
other users’ publicly accessible proﬁle information. We exploit
the observation that frequent patterns of a site’s subpopulation
or individuals with similar attribute-values on a site can be
used to infer a particular user’s hidden attribute-values.
Using a corpus of nearly 180,000 public proﬁles from
LinkedIn and Google+ collected over several months, we
construct a site-level inference engine using a combination
of multi-attribute association rule mining, Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) [3], and Na¨ ıve Bayes. Empirical evaluations
using LinkedIn and Google+ show that hidden attributes can
be inferred with high accuracy for some of our attributes. Our
results indicate that because a segment of the population is
not concealing sensitive attributes, deciding to merely conceal
sensitive attributes from one’s own online proﬁle is insufﬁcient
to guarantee privacy. The disclosure of even a small, seemingly
innocuous set of proﬁle attributes is sufﬁcient to infer a
revealing set of attribute-value pairings.
This paper makes the following contributions: (1) A
methodology for inferring sensitive attribute-values on online
social media sites using a random site-based population; (2)
An approach for developing a site-based inference engine
using multiple inference algorithms, two of which are new;
(3) A formal deﬁnition of the attacker model for the problem
of inferring hidden attributes on social media sites; (4) The
evaluation of our inference engine using two popular social
media sites; and (5) An analysis of nearly 180,000 public
proﬁles, highlighting trends on real-world social media sites.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous work has demonstrated that online users publicly
expose a signiﬁcant amount of personal data on sites such
as Facebook [9], including sensitive ﬁelds such as birth date,
hometown, current residence, and phone number. While recent
work has shown that Facebook users are reducing the amount
of information they share publicly [6], other work by Chaabane
et al. [4] of 100,000 Facebook users found that 75% revealed
gender, 57% revealed interests, and 23% revealed their current
city. While these attributes may seem less sensitive, they can be
used to infer more sensitive attribute-values, as we demonstrate
in Section V.
A number of researchers have proposed approaches for
inferring sensitive attributes from online social networking
sites. Zheleva and Getoor [21] use link-based classiﬁcation to
study the impact of friend attributes on the privacy of users
by using the attribute-values of friends in common groups
to infer a particular user’s attribute-value. Crandall et al. [5]
infer social ties using geographic proximity between two Flickr
users. They ﬁnd that a very small number of co-occurrences
near each other in a short period substantially increases the
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570probability that the two people have a social tie. Kosinski
et al. [12] apply statistical regression models to Facebook
“Likes” to predict sensitive attributes, including political views
and sexual orientation. Mislove et al. [17] use community
detection metrics to infer attributes in two Facebook data
sets. After identifying the community of the user, the authors
determine the strength of the community using afﬁnity and
also consider the common attributes of the user community
using modularity. Including friendship network structure into
our inference engine is left for future work.
Chaabane et al. [4] use a Latent Dirichlet Allocation
generative model [3] to identify relationships between different
interests speciﬁed by users. The authors then map the interest
to topic groups, and infer sensitive attributes using this topic
structure. They show that Facebook users who are interested
in similar topics with similar likelihoods have similar proﬁle
data. While components of their methodology are similar
to ours, our work considers multiple attributes and multiple
algorithms within a single prediction. One of the methods
we consider here is an extension of the one proposed by
Chaabane et al.—we use multiple attributes (as opposed to
one) as evidence for an inference and apply the method to
infer a wider range of attributes. Another inference study by
Lindamood et al. [14] uses an extended Na¨ ıve Bayes classiﬁer
to infer political afﬁliations based on friendship links and user
attributes for 35,000 Facebook proﬁles. Because we do not
have link structure in our data set, we consider a variation of
aN a ¨ ıve Bayes classiﬁer for site-based inference. Our variation,
described in Section IV, generates multiple predictions using
different numbers of attributes as evidence when determining
the hidden attribute and then considers a majority vote of the
results to ﬁnd the ﬁnal, hidden attribute-value.
Recent work in re-identiﬁcation focuses on mapping
records in different data sets to the same real world entity [8,
18, 19]. These works differs from ours since they attempt to
re-identify individuals across data sets on different sites and do
not explicitly build an inference engine for predicting sensitive
attributes. Other recent work investigates methods to measure
a user’s susceptibility to an attacker and to protect privacy
within a social network. Lie and Terzi [15] calculate privacy
scores for proﬁles. Baden et al. [2] consider mitigating privacy
risks by creating a social network, Persona, with users’ privacy
controls as a primary goal. The Diaspora social networking
service aims to improve privacy through a distributed and
community-oriented design, preventing a single organization
from collecting sensitive personal information [7]. While these
works are important directions, we focus on quantifying the
privacy risks due to participating in existing social networks.
III. SYSTEM AND ATTACKER MODELS
We model a site as a data set D(ID,A 1,A 2,...,A m)
containing m+1 attributes, where the primary key ID uniquely
identiﬁes a user of the site. The data set is a collection of user
proﬁles (also called records). Conceptually, a proﬁle contains
demographic and other information about a user, represented
as attribute-value pairings. Each attribute-value may be either a
singleton (e.g., 35 in the case of age) or may be an unordered
set of values (e.g., {HTML, Social Media, Budgeting} in the
case of skills). Each record  idi,vi
1,vi
2,...,vi
m  in the data set
D corresponds to the ith user’s proﬁle. We denote the proﬁle
for user i as Pi and use the notation Pi
j for the value of
attribute Aj for user i. For simplicity, we assume that a user’s
proﬁle is sound but may not necessarily be complete — that
is, each attribute-value Pi
j either correctly describes user i or
is null (⊥).
Our system model envisions three principals: the site
operator, the accessor, and the user. The site operator maintains
the data set and has access to all attribute-values in D. The
accessor accesses a subset (i.e., a view) V ⊆ D of the data
set, usually through a web interface or an API. In practice, the
accessor’s view is often read-only and is limited to a number of
proﬁles and attributes1. As discussed below, the adversary is a
restricted instance of an accessor. Finally, a registered user of
the site has a proﬁle stored in D. In addition to the capabilities
of an accessor, the user typically also has read-write access to
many of the attribute-values in his/her proﬁle.
The data set D may contain sensitive information. We
assume that the site provides a permissions system in which
users can deﬁne who has access to particular attributes in their
proﬁles. For example, a user may restrict certain attributes to
peer users (i.e., its “friends”) while exposing other attributes to
the public (and consequently, all accessors). The site may sup-
port ﬁne- or coarse-grain access controls, and may not allow
users to specify permissions for all attributes. At the extreme,
the site may not allow the user to conﬁgure permissions for
any of his/her attributes Without loss of generality, we deﬁne
the function restricted(i,Aj) to be   if user i restricts access
to Aj to a subset of peer users of the service, and ⊥ otherwise.
With the above deﬁnitions, we now more formally deﬁne
site proﬁles:
Deﬁnition 1 (Proﬁle): Given data set
D(ID,A 1,A 2,...,A m), the proﬁle for user i is
Pi = σID=i(D), where σ is the selection operator.
Deﬁnition 2 (Public Proﬁle): Given a data set
D(ID,A 1,A 2,...,A m), the public proﬁle for user
i is Pi = πpub(Aj)(σID=i(D)), where σ is the
selection operator, π is the projection operator, and
pub(Aj)={Aj ∈P i : restricted(i,Aj)=⊥∧ P i
j  = ⊥}.
Note that, by Deﬁnitions 1 and 2, an accessor can access all
attribute-value pairs in Pi.
Our model is intentionally generic and captures a variety
of existing online services, including social and professional
networking (Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn, Renren), micro-
blogging (Twitter), dating (Match.com), social media sites
(YouTube, Vimeo), job search (Monster), and third-party in-
formation providers (WhitePages, Spokeo), among many oth-
ers. We do not distinguish between proﬁles that have been
assembled by the user, e.g. during registration, and those that
have been collected by a third party. In this paper, we demon-
strate the effectiveness of our techniques on a social network
(Google+) and a professional networking site (LinkedIn).
Attacker Model. We model the adversary as an accessor
who wishes to learn information about a targeted user i and
is not one of i’s peers (that is, the adversary cannot access
1The accessor may itself be a registered user of the site. For example, this
may be the case if outsiders have no access to D and only registered users
can browse the site’s proﬁles.
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Fig. 1: Attribute inference methodology. The adversary samples a
random subpopulation of site-level public proﬁles (left), constructs
site-level inference rules and models using the sampled public proﬁles
(center), and applies the inference engine to a targeted user’s public
proﬁle to predict a hidden attribute-value (right).
the value of attribute Aj when restricted(i,Aj)= ). The
adversary’s goal is to discover information about i which is
not in the public proﬁle Pi.
To more formally deﬁne the attacker, we introduce a truth
function truth(i) that returns a set  id,vi
1,vi
2,...,vi
m  such
that (1) id = Pi
ID, and (2) either vi
j = Pi
j if Pi
j  = ⊥,o r
otherwise vi
j is the correct value of attribute Aj for user i.
Intuitively, truth(i) is the complete set of correct values for
user i for attributes ID,A 1,...,A m, and can contain values
that are not in D. Hence, the adversary’s goal is to infer the
set truth(i) \ Pi. Note that this includes both attributes that
are restricted using the site’s permission system, as well as
attributes that are unknown (i.e., null) to the site. Toward that
end, in this paper we attempt to infer single attribute-values
using data available to the adversary.
IV. ATTRIBUTE INFERENCE METHODOLOGY
Even though social networking sites often include privacy
settings that allow a user to control which attributes in her pro-
ﬁle are disclosed to the public, based on the previous literature
presented in Section II, we make the observation that removing
sensitive attributes from a public proﬁle is insufﬁcient to ensure
that those attributes are not easily discoverable. In this paper,
we are interested in understanding how a public attribute or
public attribute combination can be used to infer hidden values.
Therefore, we analyze how effective frequent patterns of a
site’s subpopulation are for inferring sensitive attributes that
are hidden by a particular user.
We develop an attribute inference methodology for deter-
mining non-published attributes about a targeted user. Our
methodology is based on the premise that an attacker may
explore the site in question and then use this background
knowledge to make inferences about a particular user’s non-
published attributes. Figure 1 shows the three steps in our high
level attribute inference methodology: subpopulation sampling,
inference engine construction, and determination of hidden
attribute-values.
A. Subpopulation Sampling
The ﬁrst step of our methodology is to randomly sample
a subpopulation of proﬁles from a site containing a database
D. More formally, our subpopulation D has a representative
sample of the attribute-value pairs of interest from D (i.e.,
D ⊆ D). In practice, an adversary can trivially obtain a
subpopulation sample by using a site’s web interface or API.
B. Site-based Inference Engine Construction and Determina-
tion of Hidden Attribute-Values
There are many methods for building a site-based inference
engine. We begin by extending two previously proposed ap-
proaches: one that uses Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [4]
and another based on a modiﬁed Na¨ ıve Bayes method [14].
We then propose a new approach based on multi-attribute
association rule mining. Finally, we consider an ensemble
approach that incorporates all of the different techniques into
the site-level inference engine. Construction of the inference
engine is done ofﬂine and infrequently for a particular site;
therefore, the cost of generating inference models or rules is
not signiﬁcantly burdensome to the adversary.
To clarify the different methods, we will use a toy example
based on user data presented in Figure 2. In this example, D
contains four attributes: id, gender, relationship, and industry.
The adversary is interested in determining User 6’s industry
attribute-value. In this scenario, User 6 has decided to not make
this attribute-value public. Using the site API, the adversary
obtains D, a subset of D containing the public proﬁles for
Users 1-5. The adversary will now generate his inference
engine using these public proﬁles. The remainder of this
subsection describes each of the methods that can serve as the
basis for the inference engine that the adversary will build.
LDA Nearest Neighbor Inference. Chaabane et al. use
the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) generative model to
extract semantic links between interest attribute-values [3]. Our
variation of their method is as follows.
Each proﬁle  idk,vk
1,vk
2,...,vk
q  in the subpopulation D
consists of the attribute-value pairs for some subset of at-
tributes in D. We begin by considering a particular attribute
Aq. Each attribute has a domain containing a set of values,
|Aq| = {v1,...,v m}. In LDA terms, we consider each
attribute-value a word. For each attribute-value, vk, we obtain
its related Wikipedia categories to enhance the value sets. We
ﬁrst retrieve the top relevant article describing the attribute
vk from a free text index built by the Lemur Search Engine2
over the entire Wikipedia stub contained in the ClueWeb09
collection3. The index’s size is approximately 1GB for the
compressed documents. Next, from each of these articles,
we use Wikipedia as an ontology and obtain all the cate-
gories and general categories for the top n articles using a
toolkit developed by [10]. For instance, a value “someone
like you” has top Wikipedia categories “Adele (singer) songs”
and “Singles certiﬁed septuple platinum by the Australian
Recording Industry Association”. These categories help to
create the hidden topical structure that will be inferred using
the observed attribute-values. Intuitively, the distribution of
2http://www.lemurproject.org/
3http://lemurproject.org/clueweb09/
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User  4    0.448    0.551 0.925    0.074   
User  5    0.264    0.735 0.466    0.533   
User  6    0.264    0.735 0.925    0.074   
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P(male  |  accounting)  =  0,    P(single  |  accounting)  =  0 P(accounting)  =  0.2 accounting   
P(male  |  retail)  =  1.0,    P(single  |  retail)  =  0 P(retail)  =  0.2 retail   
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Fig. 2: A toy example where the adversary is attempting to predict the industry attribute-value for User 6 using public site data. The table
on the left shows the available data. The remainder of the ﬁgure shows example scenarios for the LDA (top),N a ¨ ıve Bayes (middle), Apriori
(top), and ensemble (right) inference engines.
attribute-values of a user to the topic space represents the
likelihood that the user is interested in speciﬁc topics. With
this probabilistic model, each user proﬁle can be turned into a
vector representation of topics and probabilities for each topic.
We thus compare the similarity among users by calculating χ2
values between these vectors.
Users that have a “similar” distribution over the topics
can be identiﬁed by the adversary to infer missing attribute-
values for a different attribute Ap. Suppose for user i,
restricted(i,Ap)= , then the adversary can infer Pi
p by
identifying k neighbors with the highest similarity to i in terms
of the topic distribution for attribute Aq. Then, using a standard
majority vote of the k neighbors for attribute Ap, a value for
Pi
p can be inferred. We will discuss options for handling ties
and alternative voting schemes in the next section.
Returning to our example, the top of Figure 2 shows
the construction of the LDA-based Inference Engine. Our
algorithm begins by determining the Wikipedia categories that
map to the domains of the gender and the relationship attributes
(see upper left table in Figure 2). Topics are extracted using
these Wikipedia categories and a distribution for the attribute-
values and the topics is determined (see ‘Topics’ and ‘Topic
Distribution’ tables in Figure 2). Finally, after mapping the
attribute-value topic feature vectors to the users for each
attribute-value (see the ‘Feature Vectors’ table in Figure 2),
the similarity between User 6’s feature vectors and the other
users is determined. Let’s suppose k =2 . Since User 1 and
User 3 have the smallest χ2 distance to User 6, we assign their
value for the industry attribute to User 6. In this case: software.
Na¨ ıve Bayes Inference. To contrast the LDA classiﬁer,
we also consider the Na¨ ıve Bayes [11] classiﬁer that assumes
an underlying independent attribute model. Using D for every
attribute Aj, this method begins by determining the probability
of occurrence for all values in |Aj|. Suppose for user i,
restricted(i,Aj)= . The adversary can infer Pi
p using
the Na¨ ıve Bayes algorithm to make different predictions of
Pi
p using different combinations of attributes in D − Ap.A
majority vote is taken over all the predictions to determine the
ﬁnal value for the hidden attribute, Ap.
Looking at our running example, Figure 2 shows the
construction of the Na¨ ıve Bayes Inference Engine. The dif-
ferent probabilities are computed (see yellow colored tables
in Figure 2). Computing all the predictions for the different
attribute-value combinations and taking a majority vote over
those predictions leads to assigning the value “software” to
User 6 for the industry attribute.
Multi-Attribute Association Rules Inference. An e w
approach that we introduce in this paper involves generat-
ing multi-attribute association rules—i.e., rulesets containing
attribute-values from one or more attributes in the data set.
Each record r =  idk,vk
1,vk
2,...,vk
q  in the subpopulation
D consists of the attribute-value pairs for some subset of
attributes in D. We consider each such record a multi-attribute
transaction, and compute the frequent itemsets in the subpopu-
lation, where a frequent itemset is a set of attribute-value pairs
in D that occurs above a user speciﬁed minimum support
threshold. A high level of support in D is an indication that
a particular itemset occurs regularly in the subpopulation. We
then compute the conﬁdences on the frequent itemsets, keeping
those rulesets that are above a minimum conﬁdence threshold,
to produce the ﬁnal set of association rules. For simplicity, we
construct only single-inference association rules in which the
antecedent derives exactly one consequent attribute-value. We
remark that our association rule inference technique is agnostic
to the particular frequent itemset algorithm.
We denote the set of association rules as R. Each rule Rk ∈
R is of the form (a1,v 1),...,(aq,v q) ⇒ (a,v,c), where q is a
positive integer, (a1,v 1),...,(aq,v q) and (a,v) are attribute-
value pairs, and c ∈ (0,1] is the conﬁdence of rule Rk. That is,
the above rule can be interpreted as “the existence of attribute-
values v1,...,v q in an itemset implies the existence of value
v for attribute a with conﬁdence c”.
The adversary can infer the attribute-values using these
573TABLE I: Example attribute properties on the subpopulation samples
from LinkedIn (“L”) and Google+ (“G”).
Site Attribute Unique Entropy % Users w/
Values (bits) non-null vals
L Headline 57716 14.28 100.0
L Company Name 50124 15.29 75.14
L Title 32020 14.07 75.22
L Last Name 13010 10.85 100.0
L Skill 10399 11.39 7.03
L First Name 8224 10.34 97.18
L Interests 4818 12.23 6.7
L Location 1562 7.89 100.0
L # Connections 501 6.40 100.0
L Industry 147 6.41 87.32
L Start Date (Year) 67 3.80 45.89
L Start Date (Month) 12 3.53 41.46
G Organization Name 54698 15.08 37.74
G Display Name 34925 14.28 100.0
G Places Lived 29469 13.97 34.69
G Family Name 20387 12.38 96.34
G Title at Organization 25262 13.88 29.85
G Tagline 12031 13.54 17.32
G Given Name 11387 10.28 96.34
G Birthday 296 8.28 0.64
G Relationship Status 9 2.09 7.37
G Gender 5 0.97 86.59
G Organization Type 2 1.00 37.74
rules. The adversary can choose to consider only the conse-
quent of the rule having the highest support and conﬁdence.
Or he/she can consider all the rules that have at least a
minimum support and conﬁdence and take a majority vote.
An instance of the Multi-Attribute Association Rules Inference
is depicted at the bottom of Figure 2. Here, the frequent
itemset algorithm outputs three rules that meet the minimum
support and conﬁdent thresholds. The adversary applies the
rule {male,single}→{ software} to a user who publicly
reveals that he is male and single to infer that he is in the
software industry.
Ensemble Inference. Because these different methods
are complimentary in their approaches, we also consider an
inference engine that combines the results of the LDA-based
inference, the Na¨ ıve Bayes inference, and the Multi-Attribute
Association Rules inference outputs. This ensemble approach
uses the output of each of these different methods and deter-
mines the ﬁnal prediction based on both the majority value
and the conﬁdence of the value.
V. EVALUATION
We consider three metrics for evaluating the inference en-
gine algorithms: inference accuracy, guessability, and inference
gain. For a given attribute, we deﬁne inference accuracy to
be the percentage of inferred values that correctly describe
the targeted user. To quantify how often we are able to make
inferences—regardless of whether or not they are correct—
we deﬁne the guessability of an attribute as the fraction of
public proﬁles for which we are able to guess the attribute’s
value. Finally, to assess the efﬁcacy of the different methods,
we introduce inference gain. Inference gain is the ratio of
inference accuracy using our inference engine to inference
accuracy achieved by guessing the most frequent attribute-
value for a given attribute. Hence, inference gain provides
intuition as to how well population-based inferences perform
compared with the strategy of guessing the most popular value.
A. Subpopulation Sampling and Attribute Properties
We collected 88,085 public proﬁles from Google+ (a
popular social networking site) and 91,150 public proﬁles from
LinkedIn (a site designed for professional networking)4. Since
neither site offers random subsampling features, we collected
proﬁles by querying each service for random names. To obtain
our list of random names, we searched for random proﬁles on
Twitter—a service that uses sequential identiﬁers and hence
permits straightforward random sampling. For each random
name, we searched both Google+ and LinkedIn for matching
public proﬁles using the services’ APIs. LinkedIn and Google+
respectively returned up to 100 and 1,000 matching proﬁles for
each query. All returned proﬁles were added to our corpus of
sampled public proﬁles.
Because we need to both build and test our inference
engine, we divide the Google+ and LinkedIn proﬁles into (1)
our inference engine subpopulations (the training set), and (2)
the site proﬁles of users that our adversary is attempting to
reconstruct (the test set). Using the training set, we construct
the prediction models and the association rules, while the test
set data are used to measure the inference accuracy, guessabil-
ity, and inference gain achieved by site-level inference. We use
90% of the data for D and the remaining 10% for the test set.
To better understand the attributes that comprise the
LinkedIn and Google+ subpopulations, we present the num-
ber of unique attribute-values, the Shannon entropy over the
distribution of these values, and the percentage of users with
non-null values in Table I. We observe that the size of the
domains of the different attributes ranges from two to over
ﬁfty thousand and that while many values are disclosed by
over 75% of our subpopulation (e.g., ﬁrst name, last name,
industry, gender and title), others are rarely disclosed (e.g.,
birthday, specialty, and skills). This variability is also reﬂected
in the entropy of the attribute-values: attributes such as com-
pany name had signiﬁcant uncertainty, while others had little
variance (e.g., gender had less than a single bit of entropy).
Table I also provides insight into the type of information
that users publicly disclose. Less than 10% of Google+ users
publish their relationship status, indicating a trend towards
keeping personal information hidden from the public. The
propensity to disclose certain attributes also appears to be
correlated to an online network’s specialty. For instance, on
Google+ — a site primarily dedicated to social networking —
users generally felt comfortable revealing their gender (87%),
but rarely disclosed their job title (30%) or their organization
name (38%) to the public. In contrast, on the more career-
oriented LinkedIn network, 75% and 87% of users respectively
speciﬁed their title and industry.
B. Inference Engine Construction
We compare the performance the three inference algorithms
as well as an ensemble of these methods. Prior to conducting
the analysis, we remove attributes that are used internally by
the sites and have little outside value (e.g., objecttype and
proﬁleurl). For our test, we assume that the complete set of
4To ensure compliance with the services’ terms of service, we used the sites’
ofﬁcial APIs, obeyed rate limits, and collected data using a single machine
over a period of months.
574attribute-value pairs for each user i represents user i’s proﬁle
Pi. We apply leave-one-out cross validation for the evaluation.
Particularly, for each proﬁle, we remove one attribute-value
pair (ai, vi) (i.e., we set Pi = Pi \ (ai,v i)) and measure
the inference engine’s ability to infer this hidden attribute.W e
repeat this test for each attribute-value pair in the record.
C. Inference Accuracy
We begin our analysis by considering the accuracy as-
sociated with each method individually when using different
parameters. This is followed by a detailed comparison of the
different inference approaches. For this analysis our inference
engine makes a prediction about a single consequent attribute.
LDA-based Inference. For the LDA-based inference
model, we empirically found that basing the inference on one,
two, or three attributes leads to the best accuracy results on
these data sets. Therefore, for each consequent attribute, we
generate a ﬁnal result by taking the majority vote over these
combinations of non-null attributes. When determining the
ﬁnal similarity between the targeted user and the other users in
D,w eu s eχ2 similarity. There are two additional parameters
to consider when employing the LDA-based approach: (1)
which topics to use from Wikipedia—i.e., sibling level topics
(self categories) or parent level topics (parent categories)—and
(2) the number of nearest neighbors (k).
Figure 3 compares different approaches for generating
topics based on the Wikipedia ontology: using article self
categories, using article general (or parent) categories, or using
both. The x-axis shows the hidden attribute being inferred
and the y-axis shows the averaged inference accuracy for
inferring the hidden attribute using the other attributes in the
inference engine. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that for these data sets
the inference accuracy is stable for the different topic models.
We surmise that this is due to the narrow vocabulary semantics
associated with our attributes Therefore, for the remaining
experiments involving LDA, we use only self categories from
Wikipedia since it is less costly to build. Finally, Figure 3
also shows that the inference accuracy for social attributes on
Google+ are high, while the inference accuracy for profes-
sional attributes are high on LinkedIn.
Figure 4 depicts the inference accuracy for different at-
tributes as k varies. The y-axis shows the inference accuracy as
a function of the value of k (x-axis). If different neighbors give
different answers, a majority vote is used to resolve conﬂicts5;
if there is a tie, then no result is produced using this method.
We observe that the accuracies generally improve by two to
10 percent, depending upon the attribute. All the attributes are
fairly stable at k =5 . Therefore, for the remaining experiments
involving LDA, we set k =5 .6
Na¨ ıve Bayes Inference. Our Na¨ ıve Bayes classiﬁer makes
inferences using (i) a single attribute, (ii) two attributes, or
(iii) three attributes. A majority vote is taken over all the
5The other voting strategy we considered was reciprocal rank, but its
accuracy was lower than majority vote.
6As a comparison, we also considered a simpler term frequency model
(building a TF-IDF index) using Wikipedia categories and then computed the
cosine similarity of these Wikipedia categories. Due to space limitations, we
do not show the results. However, we found that the LDA-based inference
slightly outperformed the TF-TDF approach in terms of accuracy.
predictions to determine the ﬁnal value for the hidden attribute.
If there is a tie, no result is produced. To understand how
the strength of the majority vote inﬂuenced the inference
accuracy, we compute a conﬁdence score for each inference,
where conﬁdence is deﬁned as the ratio between the most
probable result returned by the majority vote and the second
most probable result. For example, let’s suppose we are inter-
ested in determining a user’s favorite color. If our algorithm
returns the following predictions: probability(red)=0 .7,
probability(blue)=0 .2, then the conﬁdence will be 0.7/0.2.
Figure 5 shows the inference accuracy results of Na¨ ıve
Bayes for different minimum conﬁdence settings. When points
are missing for an attribute, the inference accuracy at the
particular conﬁdence is 0. For Google+, when the minimum
conﬁdence rises from 1 to 2, the inference accuracy also
improves signiﬁcantly. This is also the case for the company
industry and the industry attributes in LinkedIn. Once the
minimum conﬁdence reaches 7, the inference accuracy for all
the attributes is relatively stable. Therefore, for the remaining
experiments, we use a conﬁdence of 7.
Association Rule-based Inference. We construct single-
inference association rules using the Apriori [1] method that
derive exactly one attribute-value pair. Association rules have
two parameters: support and conﬁdence.
Figure 6 shows the inference accuracy for Google+ and
LinkedIn attributes when we vary the support threshold
(x-axis) and the minimum conﬁdence is ﬁxed at 0.5. For
Google+, the inference accuracy increases and then decreases
as the support threshold increases. For LinkedIn, the inference
accuracy is relatively stable across different support thresh-
olds. Similarly, the inference accuracy for different conﬁdence
thresholds is also shown in Figure 6. For both Google+
and LinkedIn, inference accuracy increases with conﬁdence,
with the slope of the increase decreasing once the mini-
mum conﬁdence reaches 0.5. Both name related attributes on
Google+ and industry related attributes on LinkedIn have an
improvement of over 40% as the conﬁdence increases.
Based on these empirical results, we use a minimum
support level of 0.0025 and conﬁdence of 0.5 for the remaining
experiments. For this setting, our Apriori inference engine
produced rulesets RG+ and RLI, respectively containing 1633
and 163 association rules for Google+ and LinkedIn. If we
increase the minimum support and conﬁdence levels beyond
that, the number of rules generated decreases substantially. For
example, for over half of the attributes, no inferences were
possible when the conﬁdence threshold was 70% or greater.
D. Inference Gain Comparison of All Methods
To study the performance of our inference techniques in
more detail, we compare their performance to the simpler
strategy of predicting the most frequent value for a given at-
tribute. Figures 7 (left) and 8 (left) plot the inference gain of the
four inference engines: LDA-based, Na¨ ıve Bayes, Association
Rule, and Ensemble. (Recall that inference gain is the ratio of
the inference accuracy achieved by the inference technique to
the inference accuracy achieved by guessing the most popular
value.)
For the Google+ attributes, we obtain inference gains of
over 30 for more than half of the attributes. This is attributable
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Fig. 6: Inference accuracy of association-rule based inference as a function of the support threshold and conﬁdence threshold for Google+
(ﬁrst and third) and LinkedIn (second and fourth).
to the strong correlation between the three related name ﬁelds
(i.e., family, given, and displayname). LinkedIn has a similar
strong connection between the industry and company industry
ﬁelds, but the inference gain is lower than that achieved with
Google+ due to the (relatively) higher accuracy of guessing
the most common attribute on those ﬁelds. The results also
show that all of the tested inference techniques signiﬁcantly
outperform the na¨ ıve strategy of guessing the most popular
value, highlighting the effectiveness of inference techniques for
this problem. A site’s privacy controls are insufﬁcient to protect
privacy given an adversary who can use the user’s exposed
attribute-values as well as a site’s sampled subpopulation to
accurately predict many unknown attributes.
E. Guessability
Figures 7 (center) and 8 (center) show, for each attribute
on Google+ and LinkedIn, the fraction of public proﬁles for
which the inference engine is able to make a prediction (i.e.,
its guessability). For both data sets, association rule mining has
the lowest guessability. We attribute this to our selection of the
minimum support, which led in many instances to there being
no relevant association rules. In our parameter selection, we
opt for correctness (i.e., inference accuracy) over guessability,
and hence achieve the former at the expense of the latter.
In contrast, the LDA and ensemble methods provide the
greatest guessability. When the adversary needs to construct
a guess in a principled manner (regardless of the correctness
of that guess), these methods are most appropriate. (A trivial
method of achieving perfect guessability is to guess randomly
for each hidden attribute; however, as is indicated by Figures 7
and 8 (left), such a strategy achieves poor inference accuracy.)
In practice, the adversary likely desires both high inference
accuracy and guessability. As a coarse measure of the overall
utility of an inference technique, we consider the product of
its guessability and inference accuracy. Figures 7 (right) and 8
(right) plot this product for the different attributes for Google+
and LinkedIn. The ﬁgures further highlight the advantage of
LDA and the ensemble method: in nearly all cases, LDA and
the Ensemble outperformed Apriori and Na¨ ıve Bayes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the degree to which site-based pop-
ulation data can be leveraged to correctly infer the undisclosed
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Fig. 7: Inference gain (left), guessability (center), and guessability times inference accuracy (right) for Google+.
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Fig. 8: Inference gain (left), guessability (center), and guessability times inference accuracy (right) for LinkedIn.
attributes of online users. Our methods leverage a targeted
user’s publicly disclosed attributes, as well as the patterns of
relationships between publicly disclosed attributes on others
on the site, to predict additional attributes of a targeted
user. Similar to previous work, we demonstrate that different
inference engines are able to predict withheld attributes of
a user’s proﬁle with considerable accuracy. Our work differs
from the previous work in this arena in terms of (1) the applied
methodology, (2) the inference algorithms used, and (3) the
data sets considered. This work is an important initial step to-
ward understanding random site-based inference of personally
hidden attributes. We also analyze the distribution of attribute-
values across two large, real-world data sets. Examining the
attribute-value distributions gives us additional insight into the
types of data people feel comfortable publishing. In particular,
our examination of the disclosed attributes and values on social
networking (Google+) and professional networking (LinkedIn)
sites highlights the semantic differences perceived by users of
these services.
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